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INTRODUCTION
“Citizenship would be a privilege of the civilised; the
uncivilised would be subject to an all-round tutelage”
[Mamdani, 1996, p.17].
“Subjects are always disproportionately placed in oppo-
sition or domination through the systemic decentring
of multiple power relations which play the role of sup-
port as well as target or adversary” [Bhabha, 1994,
p.72].
Accounting and financial management techniques, compu-
tations and practices have been both implicated and directly
used in political systems that promote unjust, inhumane, op-
pressive and racist policies [Davie, 2000, 2005; Fleischman and
Tyson, 2000, 2004; Jacobs, 2000; Funnell, 2000; Neu, 2000a,
2000b; Achary, 1996]. This study makes a further contribution
by examining the significant role of accounting in the imple-
mentation of British imperial policies relating to the subjectifi-
cation of the Native population in the peripheries. It provides
new insights into accounting’s regulatory role in the production
of a quantified and imperialistic knowledge about British impe-
rial rule. An examination of British expansion into Fiji1 in the
1 British expansion into Fiji was dependent upon collaboration with indig-
enous Chiefs. This meant that an indigenous social structure based on a hierar-
chy of Chiefs became an essential requirement in the complex processes of
British imperialism and empire-building in the South Pacific. Indigenous Chiefs’
collaboration was secured by employing Chiefs as government officials. The
nature of European rule within the collaborative system is reflected by the fol-
lowing quote from The Fiji Times [29 July 1871]: “we require their sanction . . .
In all other respects, the European will rule . . . and if a prominent figure be a
native whether in the form of a king or president, it is only a puppet, the strings
of which are pulled by the white man.” The British-indigenous collaborative
form of imperialism enabled domination and control, both prior to and after a
formal annexation. British expansion at the time followed what Gallagher and
Robinson [1953, p. 13] referred to as the principle of “trade with informal con-
trol if possible; trade with rule when necessary”. Formal rule in Fiji, through
annexation on 10 October 1874, became necessary to protect British settlers and
plantation owners’ trade interests as well as to secure a strategic expansion into
the South Pacific within a broader context of metropolitan scramble for colo-
nies. More importantly and in the context of the arguments of this paper, after
annexation the collaborative system of empire management and expansion was
reinforced through the legislation of Native Regulations. As Davie [2000, p. 335]
highlights “[t]he Native Regulations and the chiefly-based structure of control
and power permeated virtually every aspect of indigenous society. What was
thought to be traditional chiefly privileges became part of an “indirect” system
of British domination.” That is, the control of the indigenous population
2
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late 19th century shows that accounting computations were an
integral part of indirect rule. Indirect rule was a colonial project
that translated an indigenous form of social stratification into
an administrative system for the domination of Native peoples.
It was a tribal approach to imperial government that dispersed
customary laws within “the wider context of alien domination”
[Mamdani, 1996, p.110]. Indirect rule enabled exploitation of
the moral discipline, trust and respect associated with clan-
based communal social structures for despotic purposes. It also
enabled human engineering for exploitative development of la-
bor as an economic resource. Insofar as the Native policy deci-
sions were sustained indirect rule gave a pre-eminent position to
accounting. The archival material related here reveals that ac-
counting had multiple functions in this project. Accounting and
budgeting were not only essential to highlighting the financial
status of the colony. They were also used by the British colonial
officials and European plantation owners to help prosecute a
particular privileged form of citizenship which gave pre-emi-
nence to Europeans and their exploitative interests.
Collaborative themes of indirect rule have recently been
used in accounting research studies. For example, Davie [2000]
applied these themes to widen the compass of accounting his-
tory to examine the interests that accounting calculations and
explanations served in imperial forms of rapprochement. How-
ever, the concern of that research was not citizenship. Annisette
[2000] also used imperial collaborative themes to study the ac-
countancy profession in Trinidad and Tobago. However the con-
cern of that paper was not expressly citizenship or accounting
calculations and explanations but rather the organization of the
accountancy profession. In the current study archival data,2
hitherto not available or examined by accounting historians,
and other relevant materials are used to show how accounting
came to promote policies that actually denied the Natives citi-
through their Chiefs. The indirect system of rule also enabled the introduction of
a poll tax based on Native labor and as imperialism progressed, the introduction
of a Native communal taxation scheme.
2 Archival data for this study was obtained at: the National Archives, Kew,
London; the National Archives of Fiji, Suva, Fiji; and the following libraries in
Australia: State Library, Sydney; Australian National University, Canberra, Aus-
tralia. The dichotomy between archival and other sources used here is not in-
tended to privilege different types of source materials but rather to provide
information about searching for the location of required archival data. The
paper acknowledges that the choice of source material is selective and therefore
biased and to this extent analyses must be viewed as subjective.
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zenship rights on their native land. In particular, the focus is on
two inter-related aspects of British imperial rule in Fiji. First,
emphasis is placed on the creation of a Native Authority within
the British controlled Fijian central governments and on the
way in which accounting became involved in institutionalizing
inequality and oppression. This was achieved through ensuring
that individual and influential Chiefs of high Fijian societal
ranking became members of the Executive Council of the Native
Affairs Office, and Chiefs of lower ranking were engaged as gov-
ernment employees to manage operations in the villages. Sec-
ond, the paper highlights the way in which oppression and in-
justice came in two further forms of forced labor. Prior to
annexation in 1874 a relatively heavy poll tax was imposed uni-
formly but differentially as between indigenous Fijian men and
women to be paid for through forced labor. From annexation to
1913 a further important provision was a requirement that Na-
tive taxation be communally rather than individually based and
paid in kind. Multiple and diverse factors contributed to an em-
phasis on generating “considerable revenue” from the Natives
[CSO3 Despatches 1877-1880, No. 37 of 1878]. It was this em-
phasis on revenue that was crucial in defining the nature of
citizenship practiced at the time. How to finance colonial activi-
ties was to be determined by the prevailing belief that the Fijian
natives in the periphery needed protection and civilizing but
within their own customary institutions of authority. Account-
ing played a central and primary role in representing one kind
of rational calculative justification for subjectification.
With the above stated focus the paper contributes to re-
search in accounting history that demonstrates the social conse-
quences of an imperial approach to government. In comple-
menting Neu [2000b] and Tinker [1980, 1991] this research
study contradicts Solomon’s [1991] general argument with re-
spect to accounting’s neutrality within political economic con-
texts such as colonialism. There is now an emerging accounting
research literature that provides greater understanding of ac-
counting calculations in differing indigenous cultural contexts
[Davie, 2000, 2004; Gallhofer and Chew, 2000; Jacobs, 2000;
Neu, 1999, 2000a] as well as in politicized contexts of race and
ethnicity [Davie, 2005; Fleischman and Tyson, 2000, 2004].
3 The following abbreviated references are used in this paper: CO – Colonial
Office; Cd or C. – Command Paper; CSO – Colonial Secretary’s Office; LCP -
Legislative Council Paper of Fiji; NR – Native Regulation; PP – Parliamentary
Papers; SP – Stanmore Papers.
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Research into the function of accounting calculations in these
somewhat sensitive arenas however remains largely unexplored.
This study complements and responds to such calls within a
historical context of British imperial rule. In doing so, it adds to
our awareness of the suppressed voices in the accounting litera-
ture. Of particular significance to this paper is Funnell’s [2000,
p.187] call for accounting historians to give “matters of justice”
greater “prominence” in their research studies.
The next section provides theoretical notes on citizenship
rights and on British indirect rule. This is followed by an outline
of the initial acts of indirect rule and citizenship rights in Fiji
prior to annexation in 1874. Thereafter a critical examination is
offered on the ways in which accounting became closely aligned
with indirect rule and citizenship rights in Fiji after British an-
nexation. The section explores how and the reasons why ac-
counting became an integral part of British imperial rule in Fiji
with specific reference to strict requirements for the colony’s
financial sufficiency. The arguments of the paper are summa-
rized in the concluding section.
CITIZENSHIP AND INDIRECT RULE:
CITIZEN PRIVILEGE AND SUBJECT TUTELAGE
Ideas of citizenship are numerous and varied. T. H.
Marshall’s [1950] seminal essay on Citizenship and Social Class4
presents the bedrock ideas of citizenship. Marshall theorized
three interdependent rights-based dimensions of citizenship
consisting of civil rights, political rights and social rights.
Marshall defined the civil element of citizenship as “the rights
necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the person, free-
dom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and
to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice” [p. 10]. The
political element of citizenship he defined as “the right to par-
ticipate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body
invested in political authority or as an elector of the members of
such a body” [p. 11]. “By the social element” he meant “the right
4 Marshall has been criticised for ignoring how citizenship rights were
earned through class struggles [Giddens, 1982, 1991]. It has been suggested that
ideas of citizenship developed in a circuitous manner [Birnbaum, 1997 quoted
in Insin and Wood, 1999] and that his analysis is limited to just one form of
inequality, namely class, when in fact there are other forms of inequality in
society [Turner, 1986]. Although these criticisms seem valid, his central concepts
remain influential, and continue to form the basis for new concepts of citizen-
ship.
5
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to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to
share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a
civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the soci-
ety” [p. 11]. Citizenship in these terms can be seen primarily as
a yardstick for measuring an individual’s societal worthiness
and membership. Boundaries of citizenship are contextually em-
bedded and are problematic, as access to membership can
emerge in “specific places in response to specific struggles and
conflicts” [Insin and Wood, 1999, p. 5]. Rawls [1999, p. 3] points
out that, “in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship . . .
are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social
interests”. As Held [1991, p. 20] notes “citizenship is above all
about the involvement of people in the community in which
they live”. To this extent, debate about citizenship, he argues,
must involve examination of the “very nature of the conditions
of membership and political participation” [ibid.]. Through such
an examination accounting historians can explore the relation-
ship between accounting and the ways in which citizenship op-
erates in different societal contexts. In this paper, emphasis is
given to the role of accounting within political economy
struggles as between social groups linked within a system of
power relations as defined by British indirect rule for empire
building.
In the context of imperial rule citizenship in the peripheries
operated as an instrument of control through social stratifica-
tion as well as exclusion. Claims of status were not only to a
hierarchical social structure but also to race-based ethnicity.
The basic ideas of racial difference in these states were incorpo-
rated into the political identities5 of social groups as civilized
citizens and so-called uncivilized subjects. Where “[c]itizenship
would be the privilege of the civilised [colons]; the uncivilised
[natives] would be subject to an all-round tutelage” [Mamdani,
1996, p.17]. Like all colonial powers the British, from the mid-
19th century, ruled through a dual system of control: one for the
ruling ‘civilized’ citizens who had civil, political and social rights
and another for the so-called ‘uncivilized’ Native subjects who
were denied similar citizenship rights. There were two comple-
mentary ways of controlling the Native subjects: direct rule and
indirect rule. Direct rule was a centralized form of despotism,
defined by the so-called ‘civilized’ laws of Britain. It did not
5 The social groups were political in the sense that they were imperial cre-
ations and impositions for control and domination (for detailed discussions see,
for example, Bhabha [1994]; France [1969]; Mamdani [1996]).
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recognize Native institutions. Mamdani [1996, p.17] describes
direct rule in European colonies more generally as “the reinte-
gration and domination of natives in the institutional context of
semi-servile and semi-capitalist agrarian relations” which “signi-
fied an unmediated – centralised despotism”. In contradistinc-
tion, indirect rule was a decentralized form of despotism that
exploited Native institutions. It was a system of control that
creatively molded and, where not present, invented customary
political institutions to empower a hierarchy of collaborating
chiefs by gazetting them as Native Authorities (see, for example,
Afigo [1987]; Crowder and Ostuntokun [1987]; France [1969];
Geschiere [1993]; Padmore [1936]). Indirect rule was about gov-
erning the subject peoples through their own indigenous Chiefs
“with newly defined powers and accountability” [Mamdani,
1996, p. 63]. Padmore [1936, p. 315] defines the principle of
indirect rule as: “the system of governing the Blacks through
their own chiefs and political institutions under the control of
European officials . . . The Whites, however, hold the real politi-
cal, financial, and military powers in their hands, while the
chiefs serve as their marionettes”.6
In this way, the subject populations in the peripheries were
“disproportionately placed” to “play the role of support as well
as target or adversary” [Bhabha, 1994, p. 72]. It was not only a
calculated way of denying citizenship rights to a vast majority of
the subject population. Indirect rule was also an inventive form
of social engineering for exploitation. These aspects of the theo-
rizing can provide a useful lens for accounting historians to
examine the relationship between accounting and the ways in
which inequality can be institutionalized in different contexts of
social arrangements. In terms of Marshall’s theorizing of citizen-
ship rights indirect rule in Fiji did not give the Natives the free-
dom to, for instance, individually own land or to engage in valid
contracts. It did not give the Natives political or social rights as
they did not have the freedom to democratically choose their
ruler nor did they have the right to social security. Indirect rule
6 A more apologetic understanding of the collaborative aspect of indirect
rule is reflected in Gallagher and Robinson’s [1953] definition of imperialism. In
challenging the traditional Euro-centric perspective they emphasise the non-
European dimensions in the peripheries. They argued that British expansion
and trade depended upon informal control through collaboration if possible and
with formal political rule only when absolutely necessary. This explanation has
since been developed to emphasise the unequal bargains between the Europeans
and the indigenous collaborators in the peripheries (see for example, Robinson
[1972]; Mommsen [1986]).
7
Davie: Accounting's uses in exploitative human engineering: Theorizing citizenship, indirect rule and Britain's imperial expansion
Published by eGrove, 2005
Accounting Historians Journal, December 200562
in this instance ensured decentralized despotism which gave the
Supreme Chief, the European Governor, absolute power to for
example, call upon the Natives to supply free labor to generate
revenue for the Treasury. The following two sections examine
the nature of citizenship rights during British indirect rule in
Fiji and the ways in which accounting calculations became an
integral part of it.
INDIRECT RULE AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS
PRIOR TO ANNEXATION
On Setting the Foundations of Indirect Rule: In Fiji, European
presence became prominent somewhat later in the mid-19th
century.7 The foundations of a non-European, local dimension
of British expansion became evident in 1867. Then Cakobau, an
indigenous Chief more pliable to European control, was ostensi-
bly installed as the King of Fiji and a government formed in his
name [Fiji Times, 1869]. The Cakobau Government appointed
Native Chiefs as provincial governors, chief magistrates, police
inspectors and sergeants, and clerks to govern the Native sub-
jects. The creation of a Ministry of Fijian Affairs further rein-
forced the governing of the Natives through their traditional
Chiefs and political institutions [Constitution Act, 1871,
Cakobau Government]. An outward correspondence from the
Native Affairs Office to a Provincial Governor dated 12 April
1872 is revealing. The traditional authorities not only had to “be
chiefs of rank” but they also had to “be influential chiefs” [Na-
tive Affairs Office, Outward Correspondence, 1872, Vol. 1, Set
45]. Customary powers of the Chiefs were thus incorporated
into an Executive Council where a hierarchy of Chiefs as Native
Authority became a decentralized arm of imperial rule. How-
ever, although the Chiefs were the pillar of Native Authority and
had absolute power over the Natives they were merely puppets
of the European rulers. This was the basis of indirect rule in Fiji.
It set in place an inexpensive and effective mode of control over
the Natives [Davie, 2000; McNaught, 1974]. This is probably
7 By the second half of the 19th century the major powers of Europe had
assumed sovereignty over most of the tropical world. In the South Pacific the
rush for colonies occurred during the latter half of the 18th century. Similar to
other British colonies, the influences crucial to the making of 19th and early
20th-century British colonies in the South Pacific were multiple, diverse and
contradictory. Fiji was attractive for a number of reasons: it had strategic geo-
graphical importance; it was a source for cotton for the Lancashire textile indus-
try; and it provided fertile land for sugar cane plantations for the Colonial Sugar
Refinery Company, a Sydney based partnership of unlimited liability.
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why, contrary to most if not all responses from the periphery,
imperial officials in Fiji were able to positively respond to the
Treasury’s attempts in London to reduce salaries [Davis and
Huttenback, 1986, p.19].
An 1874 hand-written wages record is particularly revealing
in this respect [im Thurn Papers, MS2, No. 13]. Although the
single-entry accounts do not reveal much about the accounting
practiced they do reveal much about contemporary ideas of hu-
man rights and equality. The distinction between the civil and
the customary is manifested in, for example, the accounting of
the “Salary Expenditure”. The “Salary Expenditure of the Ad-
interim Government”8 lists salary payments to both European
officials and Native Chiefs. There are two striking features: the
accounting classifications; and the amounts paid. The ledger
records show in three separate columns the “name”, “appoint-
ment” and “yearly salary”. Salary payments to Native Chiefs
were classified in two ways. They were mostly recorded as “Gen-
eral Expenses” or clearly described as “Native” followed by a
description of the position held under the appointment column.
The salary differences between the personal rights-bearing
colons and the subjected Natives highlight contemporary prac-
tice of difference. In all cases it was a native Fijian that received
the least amount in any ledger account. On average it appears
that a Native Chief received only about 15% of a European’s
salary.
In the 1870s colonial expenditure far exceeded revenue gen-
erated from various sources [CSO MP 516/79 of 1879; The Cyclo-
pedia of Fiji, 1907]. It is clear from the archival documents “that
the financial position of the Colony [w]as not one of a satisfac-
tory nature” [PP of 1876, Vol. LIV, p. 52]. A number of reasons
contributed to the urgency for financing imperial activities in
Fiji. The Cakobau Government was in an embarrassing financial
position with an outstanding debt of close to £337,0009 [PP of
1874, C. 1011]. The debt was “incurred [primarily] for the pur-
poses of the white settlers, and the balance . . . for the benefit of
high chiefs, principally Cakobau” [Derick, 1950, p. 230]. Other
factors included: malcontents amongst the Europeans [Derrick,
1950]; lack of European investment in the colony due to
8 The Ad-interim Government was a care-taker government prior to annex-
ation in October 1874.
9 These included £150,000 debt of the Cakobau Government [Stanmore Pa-
pers, Vol. XIX]; disputed amount of £87,000 owing to the land pledgers
[Hansard, Vol. CCXXI, 1874, p.1275]; and £100,000 loan from the Treasury in
Britain [Hansard, Vol. CCXXX, 1876, p. 1691].
9
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unsettled land disputes [Hansard, 1876, Vol. CCXXXI, p.1157];
Britain’s colonial policy on self-sufficiency [The Cyclopedia of
Fiji, 1907, pp. 113-114; Robinson, 1978, p. 142]; and an unsuc-
cessful attempt to raise money from a newly established bank
[Derrick, 1950]. Engaging collaborating Chiefs on the cheap was
only a partial answer to the finance problem. A further British
imperial answer to the finance problem was extraction of forced
Native labor for taxation purposes.
Forced Labor. Initial Acts of Subjectification: Forceful acts fea-
tured prominently amongst the methods used for balancing the
books of accounts. A labor tax in the form of a heavy uniform
poll tax of £1 per man and 4s per woman was imposed on
Fijians. Native participation was enforced in two ways which
also defined the two principal groups of beneficiaries: by the
European controlled government and by European plantation
owners. One method involved taking away Natives from their
villages for some 20 days per year to provide free labor for
“public works” as assigned by the British ruled Central Govern-
ment. Since the prevailing conceptions of public welfare gener-
ally excluded the indigenous population,10 public works in this
context meant building infrastructure for European trade. But
more significantly, the tax system was also a means for obtain-
ing forced labor for European planters. The Natives were “con-
signed to servitude under the operations of the law” to contract
with European planters “for a year or more of gratuitous ser-
vice” in return for payment of their tax and default penalties11
[CSO Despatch #22/26, No.22 of 1876]. For livelihood the Na-
tives depended on wild crop gathering, extended family contri-
butions and village economies. In short, trade for the Europeans
spelt servitude for the Natives. Given the required overriding
urgency for financial solvency, European need for cheap labor
and the nature of subjugation, two factors became important – a
heavy reliance on collaborating Native Chiefs and the imposi-
tion of necessary punishments. A 22 October 1872 outward cor-
respondence from the Treasury to the European Officials, for
10 The development of the indigenous state of well-being was subsidised by
the Wesleyan and the Catholic Missions. Also, a 19 September 1883 minute
prepared in response to a petition to H. M. Queen indicates that the Natives as
“the principal contributors to the revenue . . . contributed to an expenditure in
which they [had] either no interest or at best only a remote one ” [SP, Vol. V].
11 According to the same despatch this was possible because the “unknown
consequences of disobedience” instilled “a mysterious terror over the minds of
the natives”.
10
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example, shows the significance of Native customary authority
[Ministry of Finance, Colony of Fiji, Outward Correspondence,
1872-1873]: “I may rely on you using your best endeavours with
the Chiefs to secure their cooperation in collecting the Native
Taxes as speedily & as thoroughly as possible”.
The official government machinery for punishing defaulters
was jail. But as this was a relatively expensive option, defaulters
were often punished by “imprisonment on plantation” for indefi-
nite periods [CSO Despatch #22/26, No. 22 of 1876]. There were
also “cases in which most or even all of the men in whole dis-
tricts were dragged from their homes and sold as labourers to
European planters” [Derrick, 1950, p. 231]. But despite these
draconian measures and the Chiefs’ involvement extra-economic
coercion through forced labor did not contribute much to the
Central Treasury as management was difficult and defaulters
were still plenty. The need for an alternative method to balance
Treasury budgets became urgent. There was a search for a “sub-
stitute for the existing system which would bring larger returns
to the Treasury” [LCP, No. 11 of 1886]. As a result, coercion
through forced individual labor was replaced by coercion
through forced communal cropping. This is discussed in the
next section.
COLONIAL SOCIAL ONTOLOGY
Forced Communal Cropping. A Civilizing Mission?: After British
annexation in 1874 a full-fledged regime of indirect rule was
established through: (a) geographical divisions of the colony
into provinces and further sub-divisions of districts made up of
villages; and, (b) strictly enforced Native Regulations. The rules
of the system defined the basis for claims to liberty and gov-
erned the rights and duties of the Natives and in doing so forced
them into living a particular way of life. Davie [2000] outlines
the ways in which Native Regulations defined every aspect of
the native Fijian people’s domestic and everyday work and social
life. There were, for example, regulations relating to the commu-
nal ownership of Native land [Native Lands Ordinance No. XXI
of 1880; No. V of 1888; No. XXI of 1892]; dealings between the
Natives and other inhabitants of the colony [Native Ordinance
No. X of 1883]; functions and status of Native Courts [Ordi-
nance No. VIII of 1876]; regulations that defined the duties and
social obligations of the Natives [NR 4 of 1877; CSO 3434/1900
of 8 August].
Accounting too became an integral part of these despotic
laws. There were regulations relating to the accounting for
11
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Native Taxes and Expenditures [LCP No.21 of 1886; LCP No.25
of 1891]; accounting for Provincial Court Fines and Fees [NR
No. VIII of 1876]; and, accounting for Provincial Deposit Funds
[NR No. 2 of 1891]. The establishment of various councils – the
Council of Chiefs, the Provincial Councils and the District Coun-
cils consisting mainly of province, district and village Chiefs –
fortified the powers of the Chiefs within the colonial hegemony
[NR No. VIII of 1876; Native Taxes Ordinance of 1876; NR No.
III of 1912]. Among the rewards for collaboration the Chiefs
acquired: salaried civil service positions (see for example,
McNaught [1974] for an extended analysis); a 10% share of Na-
tive taxation refunds [PP of 1904, Cd 2240] and rights to “lala”12
which entitled them to demand labor from their subjects “with-
out any cost to themselves” [CO83/62, 1895] as it was “lawful for
the chiefs to demand the personal services of his people” for
their privileges and the Chief’s protection [NR No. 6 of 1912].
Collaboration also gave the Chiefs certainty of security from
intra-tribal wars and possible domination by other imperial
powers. Display and demonstration of more sophisticated war
weapons forced mountain Chiefs’ collaboration. Monetary pen-
alties imposed upon Native Chiefs held responsible for not help-
ing European officials forced the collaboration of coastal Chiefs.
For example, fines were imposed on Chiefs or their salary pay-
ments either withheld or forfeited [LCP No. 21 of 1886]. The
Chiefs thus simultaneously supported and also became the tar-
get of indirect rule.
Incorporation of a Native customary authority implied a
harmony between the interests of the ruling few Europeans and
the subjected many Natives.13 At the same time it provided a
convenient pretext for denying the Natives the rights of citizen-
ship by withholding political rights from them since governance
under customary law meant that the Natives individually could
not be enfranchised. Political rights of the Native people were
12 Although lala, described as “gratuitous services . . . rendered by the Com-
mon people to the Chiefs” was a customary institution sanctioned by some
European rulers the tyranny that it represented was also strongly criticised by
some. For example, im Thurn, the Governor in the early 1900’s described Native
governance as depriving indigenous people of respect and dignity. In his address
to the Council of Chiefs he stated that the Fijian people were “not allowed any
liberty to think and act for themselves” [im Thurn papers, 1905, File No. 33]. In
the same address the Governor highlighted two reasons for this: (a) customs
imposed upon the people by the Chiefs; and, (b) the Colonial government mak-
ing those customs into laws for the Natives.
13 For example, in 1879 there were approximately 110,000 native Fijians and
less than 500 Europeans [LCP No. 11 of 1886].
12
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represented in the Legislative Council by collaborating Chiefs,
nominated by the Council of Chiefs and selected by the Euro-
pean Governor as the Paramount Chief.14 The success of the
political institution so created also depended upon adequate fi-
nancial support. To secure financial sufficiency meant imposing
liberty-diminishing constraints which denied the indigenous
people equal economic and social rights. Native Regulations de-
fined the subject population’s obligation to the Native rulers, to
the European controlled Government and also to the Christian
religion [Native Labour Ordinances No. X of 1877; No. XXIII of
1880; No. IV of 1883]. The regulations legitimized the provision
of free labor and food as “obligations of the Fijians to his (sic)
chiefs, the government and his (sic) church” [CSO 3434/1900].
The regulations also continued to “enable planters, under cer-
tain circumstances, to acquire the enforced services of Fijian
villagers” [CO 83/34, 1884]. The Fijian Colonial Government in
this respect can best be described by what Friedman refers to as
“an agency of legitimised coercion” [1970, p. 152]. The Natives
did not have the right to choose an alternative way of life – they
were enslaved by ordinance.
A striking feature of post annexation British imperialism in
Fiji was the substitution of Native taxes in labor for Native taxes
in kind. The inclosures to the despatch of 16 October, 1874 (also
reproduced as Parliamentary Papers of 1876, Volume LIV), are
particularly illuminating. There are a number of important ob-
servations to be made from these colonial documents. First, it is
clear that there was a strong desire to promote the idea that the
substitution was “for the purpose of enabling the Native
[p]opulation to provide their [t]axes in a manner accordant with
Native [c]ustoms” [Inclosure 3, p. 83]. The traditions that the
colonial powers privileged as the customary were payment of
taxes in produce and a communal social system headed by a
hierarchy of Chiefs. The communal system was based on the
argument that: “[t]he only law hitherto known to the Fijians is
the command of his Chief and the customs of his tribe” [Inclo-
14 The indigenous Fijians did not acquire democratic voting rights until
1963. Indeed, the Chiefly hegemony set in place by British indirect rule contin-
ues to haunt Fijian society into the 21st century. A 19th century British imperial
expediency is today significantly instrumental in defining Fiji’s socio-political
economy. Since independence in 1970 the Great Council of Chiefs has continued
to be at the apex of power in Fiji. When the Alliance Party, a party with alle-
giance to the Chiefs lost the general election in 1987 two military coups were
staged to maintain the Chiefly hegemony, lost through democracy. Another coup
was staged in 2000 also in the name of the Chiefly hegemony.
13
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sure 1, p. 73] and that “[t]he individual, as regards rights and
obligations, is not (sic) known to Fijian law” [p. 80]. Second,
economic calculations also played an important part. It was said
that communal Native taxes in kind would not only be “more in
accordance with native customs” but would also be “productive
of a larger amount of revenue” [p. 83]. The following quote
shows the role revenue and cost calculations played:
If the several districts are assessed in the quantities of
produce . . . and one-half, or 10-20th of the value, is
paid to the revenues as assessed taxes, it would leave
7-20th to be paid to the producers, and 3-20th to go
towards paying for the machinery provided in each dis-
trict; that is to say, the revenue rate on the quantities of
produce there named would be 7s. By this calculation,
the native revenue should be about 11,000l, not perhaps
in the first year, but as soon as the system begins to
work. Up to the present time, and by seeking to raise
the tax in money, the sum of 4,000l per annum has
barely been reached [Inclosure 1, p.78].
Third, once Native taxation was associated with custom it be-
came necessary for the custom “to be properly defined and
settled in order to produce a very fair amount of revenue from
native sources at a moderate cost of collection” [Inclosure 1, p.
73]. Accordingly, tradition and custom were creatively sculpted
and given the force of law.
Of particular interest here is the Native Taxes Ordinance,
1876. It set in place a new way of financing post-annexation
imperial activities. Under that Ordinance every district was com-
pelled to cultivate land and to plant crops as payment in kind for
a communal taxation system. These became commonly known
as ‘Government Gardens’ and/or as ‘Government Plantations’.
The respective Provincial and District Councils of Chiefs were
responsible for their proper and careful management. Since
“collection and shipment under white supervision [were] very
expensive” these were also left to the Natives [CSO 86/1156 of
1886]. The government assessment of each district’s contri-
bution to the Fijian Central Treasury was based on population
size, soil fertility and degree of civilization [CSO Despatches
1877-1880, No. 37 of 1878].
Simple two-column tables were produced to show the
pound sterling equivalent of Native taxes to be paid by each
province or district. Exactly how these amounts were calculated
is not clear. But there were claims that revenues due from the
Natives, as an accounting classification, were calculated using
14
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the contentious Colonial Government’s “own notions of value
and weight” [Fiji Times, 10 August 1878; quoted in CO83/16,
1878 p. 270]. These were “so fixed” as to ensure “large profit to
the Government when sold” [CO83/16, 1878, p. 270]. Whatever
the methods utilized the amounts calculated provided a basis for
holding districts or provinces financially accountable. Restric-
tions on movements outside the “Home Districts” [Native Land
Ordinance Part II, 1885] ensured an abundant supply of free
labor as well as a maximum collection of revenues for the Colo-
nial Government. Allegations of oppression, slavery and servi-
tude [LCP No. 11 of 1886; CO83/16, 1878; CO83/62, 1895] were
dismissed by official claims of philanthropy: that the policy both
protected the traditional communal social system as well as
taught the “semi-civilised” Natives “European agriculture” [Fiji
Times, 16 September 1895; CSO Despatch #22/26, No. 22 of
1876; CO83/16, 1878]. Despite mounting reports of oppression,
unjust and inhumane treatment, social dislocation, deprivation
of respect and dignity, and infringement of liberty the official
ideology remained unchanged as one of civilizing the Native
peoples. In this way an imperialist financial need was repre-
sented in terms of the Natives’ need as requiring protection,
preservation and civilizing.
Cultivation of Government Gardens/Plantations was located
at the interstices of the market and barter systems of economic
relations. Contemporary tribal economy was based mostly on
barter [Wilkes, 1845, p. 250]. The taxation regulations prevented
the Natives from contracting for wage-labor [LCP, No. 21 of
1886]. Money was therefore in little circulation among the Na-
tives. This provided a political justification for forced cropping:
that the scheme was better adjusted to the native lifestyle be-
cause payment in money was “inconsistent with the state of
Fijian society” [F/83/1/1 of 30 November, 1933]. Paradoxically,
as more money came into circulation among the Natives and as
trading transactions with the Natives increased a differential
pricing system came into operation. The Natives had to pay the
“native price” for their purchases which meant paying “double
the amount” of that asked of Europeans [The Cyclopedia of Fiji,
1907, p.148].
Moreover, according to a despatch of 24th March 1878 Eu-
ropean merchants paid only about half the market value for
commodities that were produced and traded by Natives [CO 83/
16]. A quote from a European planter in the same correspon-
dence provides a possible explanation for differential pricing:
“We don’t want them to be well off. If they were starving, they
15
Davie: Accounting's uses in exploitative human engineering: Theorizing citizenship, indirect rule and Britain's imperial expansion
Published by eGrove, 2005
Accounting Historians Journal, December 200570
would be much more ready to go over to labour for us in other
islands”.
In spite of such wants a correspondence dated 24 March
1878 from the Governor to the Secretary of State described the
regime as “attempts on the part of the Government to benefit
the natives” [CSO Despatches 1877-1880, No. 37 of 1878]. It was
also argued that the communal “system [was] the one most
suited to Fijian peculiarities,” and that it “achieve[d] the maxi-
mum collection” of revenue for the Treasury [F/83/1/1, 1933].
Moral imperatives thus appeared paramount. Pecuniary consid-
erations for Empire were, however important imperatives. Colo-
nial revenue and expenditure calculations showed that “[t]he
Treasury was empty”, and at the end of 1875 the Governor of the
Colony had only £16,000 to meet an estimated expenditure of
£70,000 [The Cyclopedia of Fiji, 1907, p.135]. The new account-
ing-inclined regime was therefore a political as well as a finan-
cial necessity. The following discussion shows how accounting-
based arguments became an integral and important part of
British rule in Fiji.
Accounting Justification and Interrogation: As the system of in-
justice developed, accounting and its calculations were used as
bases for multiple and, conflicting discourses. Accounting calcu-
lations were produced in abundance to justify the new regime of
servitude. Given the precarious financial status of the Fijian
State of later 19th century it was essential to highlight economic
and financial success. The calculation and presentation of pre-
cise accounting numbers were considered to be absolutely es-
sential for making proper financial and economic comparisons.
The way in which accounting functions and practices mani-
fested particularly simple characteristics is interesting. Simple
receipt, expense and profit calculations were used to promote
and justify a relatively complex British system of indirect rule.
For example, by comparing revenues collected by forced indi-
vidual labor and forced communal cropping regimes accounting
provided a focus for interrogating previous policy decisions as
well as rational justifications for policy changes that prosecuted
a distinct form of rule that denied citizenship rights to a vast
majority of the Native population.
Such colonial functions of accounting are reflected in the
Governor, Sir Arthur Gordon’s report on the system of Native
taxation in Fiji, 1879, presented to the Royal Colonial Institute
in London [Gordon, 1879]: “The receipts from the native taxes,
which in 1875, under the old system of collection, amounted to
16
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but £3,499, reached in 1876 (during only a part of which year
the new scheme was in operation) the sum of £9,342; in 1877
that of £15,149, and in 1878 amounted to nearly £19,000”. He
further justified the system by highlighting both the low collec-
tion expenses as well as by emphasizing acts of humanity by
reference to gratuity: “The expenses incurred in 1877 in collect-
ing and shipping the produce to Levuka15 and in payment of the
eighteen persons engaged in those duties, amounted to £1,341. A
further expenditure was also incurred for the purchase and gra-
tuitous distribution of seed, tools, bags, &c., amounting to £386
5s. 10d.” Arguments were therefore presented in narrow terms
of profits based on revenue and expense budgeting forecasts to
show the “financial success” of the policy: “if the expenses be
assumed as equal to those of 1877, there will be a clear profit to
the Treasury on this tax of over £17,000, while the expenses of
collection will not have reached £2,000” [ibid.].
Such accounting-based, comparisons were reiterated by the
Governor at his Annual Message to the Legislative Council in
1879 [quoted in LCP No. 11 of 1886]. In order to show with
absolute “certainty” “that the scheme [was] a remarkable finan-
cial success” the low “collection costs” were especially high-
lighted: “The whole cost of collection, therefore, is the sum ap-
pearing as such in the accounts, which was, in 1878, £1,407. As
the gross revenue from this source in the same year was, as
above stated, £18,178, the cost of collection is thus only 7.74%.”
Emphasis on “a really huge revenue” led to the argument
that “there can no longer be any doubt that the scheme has been
a financial success” [ibid.]. From the European rulers’ point of
view the produce-based system of taxation not only succeeded
as a “social experiment” it was also “financially successful” since
“the gross revenue from the source increased substantially” at a
relatively “low cost of collection” [ibid.]. Satisfaction at the im-
provement in the financial condition of the Colony was ex-
pressed both in financial returns as well as in auditor’s reports.
As imperialism progressed statements covering several years
showing the total amount of Native taxes received each year and
its proportion to the total revenue received by the Treasury were
prepared to illustrate that Native taxes as an “item of revenue
[w]as not to any appreciable extent affected by commercial or
agricultural depression” except “by the direct visitation of God”
[PP of 1888, Vol. LXXII, p.10].16 Indeed, revenue statements
15 Levuka was the capital of Fiji at the time.
16 In reference to natural disasters such as hurricanes and droughts.
17
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showed that communal Native taxation in kind was a consistent
and a guaranteed source of revenue for the Treasury.
That Native taxation had to be produce-based meant an
exact money equivalent was difficult to calculate in the absence
of any well-organized local produce markets. Excess production
was common and resulted in ‘refunds’ for the Natives and an
additional accounting statement for the Central Treasury to pre-
pare. Accounting thus took on a function of a kind of moral
mediator. Perceived acts of justice and fair-play were demon-
strated through the use of accounting measures such as Native
revenue and surplus calculations: “in addition to the large
amount of revenue shown above, a sum of £24,367 13s. has been
returned by the Treasury in the form of refunds in respect of
produce paid in excess of district taxes as sub-assessed” [LCP
No. 11 of 1886].
Additional financial statements were produced to show how
the new taxation scheme increased Native productivity. Periodic
refund statements, for example, were prepared to show in re-
spect of each of the previous years: (a) the annual tax assess-
ment; (b) the total payments made by the Natives; (c) the
amount paid to public accounts as Native taxes; and, (d) the
amount refunded to the Natives after satisfying the assessment.
Table 1 illustrates such record keeping.
TABLE 1
Statement Showing Refund Amounts, 1889-1893
Total Payment Amount Paid to
Year Assessment(£) made by the Public Account as Refund(£)
Natives (£) Native Taxes (£)
1889 18,980 22,886 17,484 5,432
1890 19,740 25,658 20,770 4,388
1891 19,740 30,645 20,911 9,231
1892 19,740 28,448 18,256 9,692
1893 19,740 27,202 17,436 9,327
Source: PP of 1895, Vol. LXX, p. 18.
Such financial statements made it possible to argue that not
only were the Natives able to pay their assessed taxes but “that
during the past five years the natives have paid in excess of their
assessed tax . . . which has been refunded to them . . . [And] that
the amount of refund earned during each of the past three years
of the five is very nearly equal to one half of the assessment” [PP
18
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of 1895, Vol. LXX, p.18]. New ways of presenting refund ac-
counts had to be developed with concomitant development in
the taxation scheme. Annual, five-year and ten-year statements
of refunds made to the provinces were prepared for comparative
purposes. The Natives’ increased productivity was in this context
measured by their entitlement rights: money-equivalent refunds.
Accounting’s function was not only mediatory but also justifica-
tory.
But more importantly, accounting also became useful in its
perceived ability to reveal an objective view of indigenous eco-
nomic activities. The contortions of defining Native involvement
in capitalistic agriculture in terms of related revenues and ex-
penditures enabled claims to colonial social ontology: that the
Native Regulations were a successful means of developing the
Natives. In this way accounting became rooted in the ultimate
explanation of the regime’s moral-social intentions for being
able to influence more people and thereby for gaining their
greater support. Assessments of the degree of Native freedom
and equality were to this extent contaminated by imperialist
judgments about what mattered from the European imperialist
perspective – financial sufficiency. At the same time, emphasis
on financial success helped divert attention from more concern-
ing issues of exploitation and injustice. Conflicting viewpoints
about the social consequences were dismissed by a strong belief
that the system was “neither oppressive, nor opposed to the
traditional habits and feelings of the people” [CSO Despatch
#22/26, No. 22 of 1876]. They were also clouded by the belief
that revenue was not only “collected without oppression” but
they were also “cheerfully and readily given” [SP, Vol. XI, p. 21].
There was resistance, and accounting-based calculations be-
came involved in interdictory discussions and arguments. A
complex combination of both respectful regard for the Chiefs
and fear of the Chiefs’ newly acquired disciplinary powers pro-
vided a fertile ground for Native subversion. A consequence of
the Native taxation scheme was shortage of cheap labor for the
plantocracy. Explicit objection therefore came largely from
plantation owners within the European community and ac-
counting featured prominently in the production of their
counter arguments. This was most obviously manifested in the
petition for the discontinuance of the produced-based regime.
The petition presented to the Secretary of State for the Colonies
by the Chamber of Commerce used net aggregate receipt figures
and an annual tax per head to contradict official claims of finan-
cial success [LCP No. 11 of 1886 Annex 4]. According to the
19
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Petitioners: “up to the date of the Petition, financial results had
not realized expectation, the net aggregate receipts for the years
1876-77 and ’78 being but £38,426 7s. 5d, or an annual contribu-
tion of less than 2s.6d. per head from a population estimated at
110,000” [p. 9]).
The petitioners also remarked on two related points: com-
merce and labor. Allegations were made that the deplorable
state of trade in the Colony was a consequence of denying plan-
tation owners Native labor. Parliamentary Papers of 1887 [Vol-
ume LVIII, C. 5039 of 1887], which contains correspondence
relating to the Native population of Fiji, contains numerous ex-
amples of the Colonial Government’s response to such critiques.
It contains various statements that highlight the scheme’s eco-
nomic contribution to the colony. These include: the total value
of taxes paid into the Treasury by each province each year be-
tween 1876 and 1885; refunds made to the various provinces in
each year from 1877 to 1884; analyses of the amount of tax
produce exported between 1876 and 1880; and Native donations
made to the Wesleyan Missionary Society each year between
1872 and 1884. The power of accounting in colonial discourse
resided in this instance in its capacity to serve competing and
conflicting interests. The next section focuses on the way in
which accounting responsibilities changed as imperialism pro-
gressed.
Accounting Responsibilities and an Aura of Citizenship: Changes
in accounting practice reflected developments in forced crop-
ping policy. They were also suggestive of accounting’s increasing
importance to the sustaining of the regime. It is clear from the
colonial correspondence that crucial regulatory dimensions
were introduced as the project developed. Changes in account-
ing for tax refunds, for example, provide an illustration of the
rulers’ response to human indiscretion. Initially a Buli as the
head of the Native social organization was responsible for dis-
tributing refunds to the Natives. He received 10% of the total
amount refunded to the Natives for surplus production. As a
result of mounting complaints of “shortages in the repayments”
against the Bulis “more effective means [were] adopted to secure
repayment in full to the individual” Natives [PP of 1904, Cd
2240]. Special returns were prepared showing the distribution of
refunds to each district within a province and the 10% payable
to the Buli. Also, previous practices of crediting future assess-
ments were removed and full payment of refunds made compul-
sory.
20
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 32 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss2/4
75Davie: Accounting in Exploitative Human Engineering
Accounting work was initially centralized at the Native Of-
fice. Much effort was put into designing the keeping of provin-
cial books of account. As a result, there was a push for Native
Chiefs who held official positions to learn how to properly keep
provincial cash accounts. This was to help them meet the statu-
tory requirement for a six monthly financial report to be sent to
the Native Office [LCP No.21 of 1886]. It thereby became pos-
sible to link the financial performance in each province to over-
all profitability of the Native Authority within the Central Gov-
ernment. At the same time comparative financial reporting
became an important mechanism for inducing competition for
increased cropping. It seems most probable that the six monthly
financial reports were used to assess the Chiefs’ performance
and for imposing penalties. Fears of punishment, albeit in dif-
ferent forms, continued to help meet Treasury budget require-
ments. The control mechanisms implemented reflect the focus
on a particular kind of accountability and on getting the system
right in terms of balancing Treasury budgets.
Accounting played a vital part in exacting a stricter financial
accountability and one that reflected institutional arrangements
of rights and duties. From about the early 20th century there
was a gradual transfer of “the accounting work of each prov-
ince” to local offices [CSO Despatch No. 25, Enclosure No. 1 of
19 June 1914]. There are two important observations to be made
from the colonial records. First, deliberate efforts were made to
define and encapsulate the financial responsibilities of the
Chiefs. Each province headed by a Native Chief had its own
annual estimates of revenue and expenditure. Separate provin-
cial classifications enabled a continuous assessment of Native
revenues and expenditures through regular comparisons. Prov-
inces were rated according to efficiency and effectiveness
against one another in financial terms of “Surplus and Deficits”,
“Increase/Decrease in percentage of Collection” and “Gross and
Net Deficits”. From these records the colons were able to pre-
pare surveillance statements of refunds, revenue, expenditure,
and assets and liabilities as specified in detail by the Central
Treasury in Fiji. These were used to ensure that all obligations
and privileges as converted into monetary equivalents were sat-
isfied.
Second, tighter financial and accounting control mecha-
nisms were introduced by requiring annual and later quarterly
financial reports to be submitted to the Secretary for Native
Affairs for auditing by European officials at the Central Trea-
sury. Attempts were made to allocate auditing responsibilities in
21
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the provinces to high ranking Chiefs by suggesting that they
should: “provide a more thorough and frequent audit of the
accounts of native officials, who are entrusted with public and
provincial monies” [CO 83/185/10, 22 March 1929].
But the European Auditor reminded the Colonial Secretary
about the rules and regulations of the Director of Colonial Audit
and highlighted that “[u]nder Native Regulations the Auditor is
responsible for the audit of Provincial Funds” [ibid.]. Moreover,
he stated that:
. . . irrespective of the fact of the existence of the
Director’s ruling, I consider it to be a very unwise policy
for me to adopt, of setting a native official of high rank
to oversee and audit the accounts in charge of a Roko
or Buli of possibly lesser rank, in view of the peculiar
circumstances which govern Fijian relationships [ibid.].
As a result, he deliberately “avoided” implementing a system
that did not respect the Chiefly hierarchy. In this way the design
of the accounting system and the auditing of it were fused with
the status and power of each Chief within the Native Authority
and with the Central Colonial Government. It helped both re-
flect and reinforce contemporary colonial structures of domina-
tion and exploitation. A new culture was enforced through the
design of an accounting control system that involved an in-
creased but selective Native participation. The financial defini-
tion of responsibilities and obligations of the Chiefs provided a
kind of aura of citizenship. In so doing, the British rulers further
reinforced the philosophies of indirect rule in Fiji.
CONCLUSIONS
British indirect rule in Fiji exposed the ultimate conse-
quences for a society based on a conception of civilizing where
entitlements and rights were defined entirely in terms of deny-
ing citizenship to the vast majority of the population. Contrary
to apologist arguments and official colonial documents indirect
rule was not about progress and development of the Native
population in Fiji. Rather it was about the exploitation of ances-
tral symbols of leadership for Empire building. So deliberate
was the effort to create a second class status that the Native
Authority became a fetish for the colonized population. It was
this fetishism and the lack of challenge from the Natives that
denied them citizenship rights within their own land. As a tech-
nology which evolved in response to developments within in-
direct rule, accounting appears to have been indispensable to
22
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British imperialism. Accounting measures of performance facili-
tated British imperial strategies of hierarchization and
marginalization of its subjected population. Accounting pro-
vided a very practical way of measuring, monitoring and ex-
pressing in economic-monetary terms the institutional conse-
quences of indirect rule. In addition, accounting provided
calculations to compare and contrast the achievements and pos-
sibilities of alternative policy decisions. With an institutional
structure in place, innovations through accounting provided a
new way of controlling and coordinating the subjected popula-
tion within imperial systems of government. Accounting systems
design reflected and helped reinforce Native hegemonic struc-
tures of power within British imperialism which deprived the
native Fijians of citizenship rights. Once established these insti-
tutionalized accounting calculations were used to justify as well
as to interrogate, evaluate and contradict specific policies relat-
ing to the maintenance of servitude. In this respect the power of
accounting resided in its ability to simultaneously serve multiple
interests. In short, accounting was intertwined with the emer-
gence and perpetuation of the philosophies and practices of ex-
ploitative human engineering in British ruled Fiji.
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